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SEEN AND NOT HEARD: RECENT
LEGISLATION AFFECTING CHILD WELFARE
IN WEST VIRGINIA
RICHARD L. WrmErS*
Recent legislation (in particular, revisions in child-welfare law
passed during the 1977-78 session of the West Virginia Legisla-
ture') and recent judicial decisions have raised, but left unan-
swered, fundamental questions about the proper relationship be-
tween the institutions of government and the institution of the
family.' Rights to familial privacy and parenthood' have been
* A.B., Alderson-Broaddus Colleges; J.D., Boston University 1976; presently
serving as Legal Counsel to the West Virginia Commissioner of Welfare. The author
wishes to thank Mr. Curtis Waldron and Mrs. Charlotte Sears for their invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 W. VA. CODE §§ 49-1-1 to -5, -2-14, -5-1 to -17, -5A-2, -6-1 to -8, -6A-1 to -10,
-7-1, -6, -27 (Cum. Supp. 1977) [hereinafter referred to as Senate Bill 200] (amend-
ing W. VA. CODE §§ 49-1-1 to -5, -2-13 to -14, -5-1 to -15, -5A-2, -6-1 to -5, -6A-1 to
-4, -7-1, -6, -27 (1976 Replacement Vol.)); W. VA. CODE §§ 49-5-8, -10 (Cum. Supp.
1977) (amending W. VA. CODE §§ 49-5-8, -10 (1976 Replacement Vol.)) (Several
minor changes were added by House Bill 114 passed during the first extraordinary
Session of 1977, Act of May 5, 1977 ch. 6, W. Va. Acts 1st Extraordinary Sess. 1054,
relating to appointments and payment of counsel in juvenile proceedings). Act of
March 11, 1978, Enr. S.B. 364, Reg. Sess. (1978) §§ 49-1-1 to -5, -2-13, -5-1 to -3a,
-7 to -17, -5A-3, -5, -6B-1 to -4, -7-1, 62-13-2 [hereinafter referred to as Senate Bill
364] (amending §§ 49-1-1 to -5, -2-13, -5-1 to -2, -7 to -17, §§ 49-5A-3, -5, -7-1 (1976
Replacement Vol & Cum. Supp. 1977), 62-13-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
2 Those questions may best be explored in light of the historical development
of child or infant status and in light of the judicial and statutory context in which
child-welfare revisions have been placed. Discussion of the requirements and expec-
tations the legislature has placed upon the judicial and executive branches may
reveal potential deficiencies in legislative consideration of child-welfare law.
Under the revised statutes, it is easy to determine the class of persons which
comes within the definition of "child" for child-welfare purposes because age alone
is now the determining factor. In the past, age was only one factor to be considered.
W. VA. CODE § 49-1-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (amending W. VA. CODE § 49-1-2 (1976
Replacement Vol.)) provided a definition of "child" that specifically included an
element of need.
"Child" means any minor who is crippled or any minor under the age of
eighteen years who, because of lack of a home, inadequate care, neglect,
illegitimate birth, mental or physical disability or undesirable or delin-
quent conduct is in need of services, protection or care.
This definition may have raised serious questions concerning the applicability of
certain licensing standards established under the chapter for child-care facilities.
See, e.g., the provisions of W. VA. CODE §§ 49-2-4 to -12 (1976 Replacement Vol.)
authorizing day care, foster care and other licensing and certification procedures.
By contrast, Senate Bill 364, supra note 1, now provides in § 49-1-2:
1
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declared to be constitutionally based.' Public awareness of and
interest in the problems of child abuse and neglect have increased.
The inability of many parents to deal with runaway children, prob-
lem behavior and potentially criminal activity of their children has
led to various demands for more tools and alternatives with which
to work. Initial legislative attempts at establishing a new and com-
prehensive system of child welfare and delinquency services cannot
help but be imperfect. Even so, after an examination of the proce-
dural problems created by the juvenile revisions, one wonders if
the legislature does not need to find some new apparatus for chew-
ing what it has bitten off.
I. HisToRmcAL DEVELOPMENT
Current child-welfare issues may best be understood by noting
developments over the last century which have contributed to
changes in the treatment of children under laws governing care,
custody, and control and under laws governing delinquency. Three
basic processes have been involved: first, the development of au-
thorization for state intervention in family relationships where a
child's welfare is endangered because parents are unfit or are una-
vailable;' second, the development of rules for the proper disposi-
tion of child custody between fit and capable competitors for cus-
"Child" means any person under eighteen years of age. Once a child is
transferred to a court with criminal jurisdiction pursuant to section ten,
article five of this chapter, he nevertheless remains a child for the pur-
poses of the applicability of the provisions of this chapter with the excep-
tion of sections one through seventeen of article five of this chapter.
Perhaps a brief discussion of several basic problems related to the legal status of
children and the administration of child-welfare law will spur further research and
inquiry.
The public has been primarily concerned with definitions of juvenile delin-
quency (W. Va. Code § 49-1-4 (Cum. Supp. 1977)), procedures (W. VA. CODE §
49-5-1 to -7 (Cum. Supp. 1977)), and remedies (W. VA. CODE §§ 49-5-8 to -13 (Cum.
Supp. 1977)). I will address the legislative response to those concerns with particu-
lar attention paid to juvenile procedures in the context of the child-welfare revi-
sions. The practical problems involved in administering the revised juvenile laws
appears to have been the primary focus of the 1978 revisions.
3 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); In Re Willis, 207 S.E.2d 129 (W. Va.
1973).
- See W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) as amended by Senate Bill 364,
supra note 1, which recognizes the fundamental rights of parenthood.
' W. VA. CODz § 49-6-1 to -8 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 80
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tody (as upon the dissolution of marriage);7 third, the establish-
ment and development of the juvenile court and corrections sys-
tem.8 The 1977 and 1978 welfare revisions have amended chapter
49 of the West Virginia Code, which deals primarily with state
intervention and not with settlement of custody disputes among
private citizens. The development of current child-welfare con-
cepts and especially the best-interests-of-the-child doctrine has
been substantially affected by the rules developed to resolve cus-
tody questions in domestic disputes
A. Child Custody Considerations
Active state intervention in situations of child abuse and neg-
lect sufficient to alter the legal structure of the family is a modern
development initiated by the West Virginia Legislature in 1941.' 0
Prior to 1941 the fitness of a parent was a consideration generally
raised in the courts only by private parties competing for custody."
Recognition by the state legislature of a need to sanction certain
private and public care and custody of orphans and other destitute
children has existed, however, nearly from statehood.'2 The limita-
tions of state agency intervention in family relationships and the
responsibilities assumed by state agencies upon obtaining custody
of a child have been addressed by the courts only recently.'" Court
Id. § 48-2-15 (1976 Replacement Vol.). A recent discussion of the problem of
judicially determining custody among otherwise "fit" persons is found in J.B. v.
A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978).
S W. VA. CODs § 49-5-1 to -17 (Cum. Supp. 1977), §§ 49-5A-1, -3 to -6 (1976
Replacement Vol.), § 49-5A-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
In Re Willis, 207 S.E.2d 129 (W. Va. 1973).
" In chapter 73 of the Acts of the Legislature of 1941, procedures were estab-
lished allowing state initiation of an action to intervene in and alter family struc-
tures including the power to remove children from the family and the power to
terminate all parental rights thus theoretically leaving a child free for adoption;
codified at W. VA. COD § 49-6-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
" See, e.g., Pierce v. Jeffries, 103 W. Va. 410, 137 S.E. 651 (1927).
' Neider v. Reuffs, 29 W. Va. 751, 2 S.E. 801 (1887), provides an early discus-
sion of the state interest in the care and custody of children. Brief mention is made
of several legislative enactments such as that passed in 1870 entitled "An act to
provide for orphans and destitute children," id. at 755, 2 S.E. at 803. These enact-
ments actually did little more than to authorize private and local care.
'3 West Virginia Dep't of Pub. Assistance v. See, 145 W. Va. 322, 115 S.E. 2d
144 (1960). The court here declares that a parent may not be deprived of the legal
custody of a child absent any neglect, mistreatment or voluntary act on the part of
the parent. In the case of In re Johnson's Adoption, 144 W. Va. 625, 110 S.E.2d 377
(1959), the court declared that the legal custody of an infant relinquished to the
Department of Public Assistance by its parent was sufficient to give the Depart-
3
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decisions appear to have been incorporated into many of the child
abuse and neglect procedures outlined in chapter 49.14
One of the more interesting developments in domestic law
over the last century has been the shift away from exclusive pa-
triarchal primacy in family matters. 5 The case of Neider v. Reuff,
decided in 1887, established the father's right to custody of all
infant children against any claim of right in the mother." In 1901,
in the case of Cariens v. Cariens, the court turned the tables in
favor of mothers in an emotional appeal to humanity and civiliza-
tion.'7 Boos v. Boos declared another modification of the rule in
1923.'1 There the court cited changes in the West Virginia Code of
1921 and 1923 which provided that if parents are living together,
neither has a paramount right to custody, control, services, and
earnings of the child. 9 The courts have attempted to sort out com-
ment a right to immediate physical possession of the infant against foster parents
who had filed for adoption themselves to be fit to care for the infant. The court
further ruled in In re: Simmons Children, 154 W. Va. 491, 177 S.E.2d 19 (1970),
that certain necessary procedural and evidentiary protections must be afforded in
cases where the State Department of Welfare seeks custody based on allegations of
parental neglect. These cases appear to culminate in In re Willis, supra which case
contains a discussion of a range of potential State Department of Welfare custodial
authority from temporary or emergency custody to permanent custody with a ter-
mination of parental rights.
" W. VA. CODE §§ 49-6-1 to -8 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
" The case of Rust v. Vanvacter, 9 W. Va. 600, 601, 612 (1876), declares the
father to be the natural guardian of his infant children and therefore legally entitled
to the child's care, custody, control and services.
'5 29 W. Va. 751, 761-62, 2 S.E. 801 (1887).
'7 50 W. Va. 113, 40 S.E. 335 (1901). The court provides the following:
The mother will need the help of this boy when he shall become
older; the father does not. The boy is but seven years of age. The law as
to the custody of the children has been greatly modified. Formerly, the
right of the father to its custody was almost an inflexible rule. That rule
forgot that a mother had a heart. The real owner of the child, be it even
a baby, must give it up. But civilization, advanced thought and human
kindness have bent this iron rule and opened the ears of the courts to the
pleading of the true friend and owner of the child. Id. at 118, 40 S.E. at
337.
" 93 W. Va. 727, 117 S.E. 616 (1923).
" Id. at 735, 117 S.E. at 619. The court relies upon legislation passed in 1921
and 1923 amending W. VA. CODE § 44-10-7 (Cum. Supp. 1977), which section now
contains the following pertinent language:
Every guardian ... shall have the possession, care and management of
his ward's estate, real and personal, and out of the proceeds of such estate
shall provide for his maintenance and education; and shall have also,
except as otherwise provided in this article the custody of his ward. ...
[Vol. 80
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plex social questions to arrive at solutions to custody disputes by
weighing the relative fitness of the contestants and the welfare of
the child rather than by relying upon mere ownership rights." The
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is still struggling with
this problem as noted in J.B. v. A.B.,2' which reaffirmed the appli-
cation of the child-of-tender-years presumption favoring custody
by mothers.2 2 In another important application of sociologically
But the father or mother of any minor child or children shall be entitled
to the custody of the person of such child or children, and to the care of
his or their education. If living together, the father and mother shall be
the joint guardians of the person of their minor child or children, with
equal powers, rights and duties in respect to the custody, control, serv-
ices, earnings, and care of the education of such minor child or children;
and neither the father nor the mother shall have any right paramount to
that of the other in respect to such custody, control, services or earnings,
and care of the education of such minor child or children. If the father
and mother be living apart, the court to which application is made for
the appointment of a guardian, or before which any such matter comes
in question, shall appoint, as guardian of the person of the minor child
or children of such father and mother, that parent who is, in the court's
opinion, best suited for the trust considering the welfare and best inter-
ests of such minor child or children.
It is the experience of the author that conflicts often arise in situations where
the circuit court has awarded custody and control to a party or agency under
chapter 49 and guardianship has been granted to a different party by appointment
of the county commission under the provisions of W. VA. CODE § 44-10-3 (1966) last
amended in 1923, years before custody provisions were developed in chapter 49.
Often, appointments of guardianship under chapter 44 are made merely by filing a
form with the county clerk and the posting of a bond. See W. VA. CODE § 44-10-5
(1966). These provisions were developed primarily in contemplation of the death
of both parents and the failure of the parents to appoint a testamentary guardian.
See W. VA. CODE §] 44-10-1, -4, -6 (1966). The authority of the courts to terminate
parental rights under chapter 49 allows for the use of chapter 44 guardianship in a
manner never contemplated by the legislature. Termination of parental rights often
leaves a void not adequately met by the provisions of chapter 49.
" Boos v. Boos, 93 W. Va. 727, 736, 117 S.E. 616 (1923). General presumptions
have been established to help in sorting out the respective rights to custody in
divorce proceedings. One of the most controversial has been the child-of-tender-
years presumption favoring maternal custody. See Funkhauser v. Funkhauser, 216
S.E. 2d 570 (1975); Settle v. Settle, 117 W. Va. 476, 185 S.E. 859 (1936). One of
the more important presumptions is that in favor of the express wishes of a child
at an age of discretion. See Murredu v. Murredu, 236 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1977);
Holstein v. Holstein, 152 W. Va. 119, 160 S.E.2d 177 (1968); Rust v. Vancacter, 9
W. Va. 600, 612 (1876).
21 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978). Footnote 4 of the decision by Justice Neely
suggests the problems faced by the courts where, on the one hand, rules of evidence
and construction are necessary for the efficient administration of justice and where,
on the other hand, such rules may distort the proper outcome of individual cases.
2 Id. Syllabus, Point 2. This discussion of the child-of-tender-years presump-
5
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derived assumptions, the court in Arnold v. Arnold23 declared a
general rule that division of custody between divorced parents is
not conducive to the best interests of the child and ordinarily
should be avoided.u To gain a clear appreciation of the considera-
tions woven together to form a method of custody resolution in
situations which may or may not involve the state as an active
party, it is important to note that parental rights and responsibili-
ties are best defined by the legislature, chapter 44, article 10 of the
West Virginia Code.2 These provisions are generally derived from
common law concepts surrounding guardianship of a child's es-
tate."8 Chapter 49, however, provides that appointment of a guard-
ian under any provisions of the chapter, entitled "Child Welfare,"
shall not affect guardianship of the estate of a child. Note, how-
ever, that all parental rights may be terminated under chapter 49
and the child released for adoption.2 It would be easy to apply the
provisions of chapter 44 in terms of guardianship of the estate and
the provisions of chapter 49 in terms of guardianship of the person.
Certainly the legislature has not deemed fit to restrict each chapter
to such terms. Furthermore, specific statutory provisions dealing
with the emancipation of minors, logically an adjunct to the
parent-child relationship established in chapter 44, or at least con-
tion comes soon after the decision of the court in Murredu v. Murredu, 236 S.E.2d
452 (W. Va. 1977), which decision fails to adequately deal with the issue. In
Murredu the court finds it unnecessary to discuss the issue and affirms the lower
court decision which, inter alia, awards custody of an eight year old to his father.
Id. at 458.
112 W. Va. 481, 164 S.E. 850 (1932).
24 Id. at 485, 164 S.E. at 852.
W. VA. CODE §§ 44-10-1 et seq. (1966 & Cum. Supp. 1,977). See also note 19,
supra.
21 Section 7 of the article goes well beyond estate considerations covering and
defining those rights and responsibilities inherent in the concept of guardian of
the person of a child. This range of rights and responsibilities was established in
section 7 long before the state had developed its own devices for obtaining custody,
care or control of children. See notes & text accompanying notes 9-13, supra. It is
therefore probable that distinctions between guardianship of the estate and guardi-
anship of the person of a child were less useful at the time these provisions were
developed.
W. VA. CODE § 49-7-2 (1966).
W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(a)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides for termination of
parental rights in neglect and abuse proceedings with commitment of the child to
the permanent guardianship of the state department. This creates an anomolous
situation when read with section 49-7-2, leaving open the question of the existence
of guardianship of the estate of a child so committed. A review of cases where
parental rights have been terminated reveals that poverty is almost universally
involved limiting the possibility of a practical dispute arising over questions of the
child's estate. See, e.g., In Re Willis, 207 S.E.2d 129 (W. Va. 1973).
[Vol. 80
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol80/iss2/6
CHILD WELFARE
sistent with the provisions of chapter 48 governing domestic rela-
tions, have instead been placed in chapter 49 under "General Pro-
visions." 9 An important and thought provoking development is
the addition of a definition of "guardian" to Senate Bill 364.11 No
definition of "guardian" has been previously provided in chapter
49. "Guardian" is now defined as "a person who has care and
custody of a child as a result of any contract, agreement or legal
proceeding."'" This definition raises serious questions about the
extent to which traditional powers of guardianship have been mo-
dified. For example, foster parents or friends of the family who
receive temporary care and custody by agreement are now guardi-
ans under this definition. It cannot be assumed, however, that the
legislature intended this kind of guardianship to give rise to powers
such as the power to consent to major medical treatment or to
consent to early induction into the armed services or even the
power to consent to marriage. It will therefore be provident for
persons, agencies, and courts which deal with custody matters to
spell out clearly in any agreements or orders those powers and
responsibilities which are intended to be conferred upon the party
or parties obtaining care and control. Failure to do so may place
guardians at risk for damages not only in situations where they
have overreached their contemplated authority but also in situa-
tions where a guardian could be accused of neglect.
32
B. Juvenile Courts; Children in Need of Services; and the Demise
of Parens Patriae
The primary focus of the 1977 and 1978 revisions (i.e., Senate
Bill 200 and Senate Bill 364 respectively) was modernization of the
approach to problems of juvenile delinquency and related proce-
dures and practices. The juvenile court system was initially con-
ceived in an idealistic climate nationwide.3 It emerged as a sepa-
W. VA. CODE § 49-7-27 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
W. VA. CoDE § 49-1-5(9), ENR. COM. SUB. S.B. 364, at p. 5. This Bill was
passed by both houses on March 11, 1978, the last day of the regular session. The
House and Senate versions contained no reference to a definition of "guardian"
prior to the deliberations of the conference committee. The author was fortunate
to have the opportunity to observe conference activities and activities on the floor
of both houses resulting in passage late in the evening of March 11. The author
notes here that there was no discussion on the floor of either house concerning the
addition of this definition by the conference committee.
31 Id.
Senate Bill 364, pp. 3-4.
= M. WmTnmm , JuvENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 1 (1974). See also Comment,
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rate judicial hybrid court at the turn of the century and rapidly
grew throughout the country, fostered by an interest in sociological
principles as an answer to the problems of delinquency." Part of
the impetus behind the establishment of the juvenile court system
was the removal of children from what was perceived to be a brutal
criminal process. The juvenile court also offered a mechanism for
handling children whose behavior, though not criminal, was other-
wise unacceptable, such as incorrigibility and truancy. It appar-
ently was assumed that children or juveniles were not fully respon-
sible for their conduct and, as wards of the state, would be suscep-
tible to complete rehabilitation."
Parens patriae0 has become the doctrinal justification for an
informal adjudicatory process. Until 1966 there was no case law
extending the constitutional rights afforded adults in the criminal
process to juveniles in the juvenile system. In Kent v. United
States37 the United States Supreme Court declared that benevo-
lent purpose "is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness."38
The Court also noted that, in practice, a juvenile "receives neither
the protections afforded adults nor the solicitous care and regener-
ative treatment postulated for children."39 A series of due process
cases followed Kent extending to juveniles most of the protections
and rights afforded adults in the criminal process." The last de-
cade has seen the development of a juvenile court system which
embodies a legalistic as well as a rehabilitative orientation.' The
dual philosophy of fair treatent and the provisions of services has
Juvenile Courts - Waiver of Juvenile Jurisdiction After Adjudication of Delin-
quency Violates Double Jeopardy Clause of Fifth Amendment, 78 W. VA. L. REV.
428, 430-31 (1976).
S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (1974). The
first juvenile court was established in Illinois in 1899. West Virginia established a
juvenile court system in 1936. Act of June 20, 1936, cb. 1, 1936 W. Va. Acts 1st
Extraordinary Sess. 59, as amended by W. VA. CODE §§ 49-5-1 to -17 (Cum. Supp.
1977).
35 The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909).
36 The power of the sovereign to act as a parent to subjects under disability
such as children or the mentally ill.
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
Id. at 555.
Id. at 556.
ia See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); DeBacker v. Brainard, 396
U.S. 28 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See Warmuth, Procedural Due
Process in the Juvenile Courts of West Virginia, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 16 (1973).
11 See Siegel, Senna, Libby, Legal Aspects of the Juvenile Justice Process: An
Overview of Current Practices and Law, 12 NEw ENG. L. REv. 223 (1976).
[Vol. 80
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contributed to the increased burdens already placed upon court
dockets and has taxed government resources to the limit.2 Several
solutions to the problem have been proposed including the diver-
sion of youths from the judicial process,43 the elimination or reduc-
tion of status offenses cognizable in the juvenile system,44 and the
development of community based alternatives.45 Elements of all of
these proposals appear in Senate Bill 200 and Senate Bill 364.
42 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIM 55-89 (1967).
41 Current planning of youth services organizations and agencies appears to be
predicated on the assumption that once a youth actually appears in a juvenile court
proceeding society has already failed. A heavy emphasis is placed upon pre-
delinquency programs, counseling and other measures aimed at diverting youths
from the juvenile system. See CENTER FOR ACTION RESEARCH, INC., A DESIGN FOR
YOUTH DEVELOPMENT POLICY (1976).
11 Ketcham, National Standards for Juvenile Justice, 63 VA. L. REv. 201
(1977). In this article Judge Ketcham describes the basic recommendations of the
Institute of Judicial Administration of New York City and the American Bar Asso-
ciation in the report of the IJA/ABA Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Stan-
dards. The Joint Commission recommends eliminating status offense jurisdiction.
Judge Ketcham summarizes:
Under the Standards the juvenile court will retain jurisdiction to inter-
vene in a child-parent relationship only
(1) to adjudicate and dispose of criminal offenses committed by
juveniles between ten and eighteen that, if committed by an adult,
would be punishable by imprisonment;
(2) to adjudicate and impose sanctions for serious juvenile traffic
offenses;
(3) to protect a child from abuse or neglect by a parent or cus-
todian; and
(4) to protect a child temporarily from imminent physical danger
caused by a serious psychological disability (suicidal tendencies,
for example) or by the child being homeless or in conflict with
parents so as temporarily to deprive the child of custody and sup-
port.
To insure that juvenile courts do not overuse the last category, the Stan-
dards limit confinement for involuntary protective custody to six hours,
for emergency medical services to seventy-two hours, and for voluntary
protective placement of a runaway juvenile to twenty-one days. Id. at
204.
11 See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, 55-89 (1967). The Presi-
dent's Commission recommended the establishment of Youth Services Bureaus
to provide integrated, community based programs. Id. at 83. One of the first
major developments in West Virginia in response to this recommendation was a
publication of a detailed model for a youth services system serving the Charleston
community, D. Sutton, P. White, D. Rubenstein, Model of a Youth Service System
for the City of Charleston, West Virginia (West Virginia College of Graduate Stud-
ies 1973).
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IH. JUVENILE REVISIONS: STATUTORY IMPACT AND REMAINING
QUESTIONS
Legislative consideration of juvenile law reform must take into
account at least three competing views held by reformers. First,
those with a law-enforcement orientation insist that too much at-
tention has been paid to the parens patriae philosophy of the juve-
nile court and not enough attention has been paid to the victims
of delinquency. Proponents of this position argue that society re-
quires certain protections from destructive behavior and that the
more serious offenders should be punished rather than treated." A
second view, based on the social welfare origins of the juvenile
court system, suggests that necessary reform can be accomplished
by emphasizing the role of the juvenile court as "a treatment
agency dispensing personalized, individual justice."4 A third ap-
proach to juvenile justice reform is based partially on the notion
that involvement of a youth in the juvenile system produces more
negative results than positive. Reformers holding this view gener-
ally insist upon the extending of all procedural and evidentiary
protections to youths who have contact with the juvenile system.
The establishment of such procedural protection will help to divert
youths from the system."8 Analysis of Senate Bill 200 and Senate
Bill 364 indicates that the former act reflects the due-process em-
phasis favored by the third category of reformers, whereas the
latter act appears to be a response by persons with a law-
enforcement or judicial orientation.
A. What is a Juvenile Delinquent?
Prior to 1977, the Code provided for nine categories of delin-
quency." The definition of a delinquent child included any child
" W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) must be read as implying that the
only function of the juvenile delinquency system is to provide care and rehabilita-
tion for offenders. The 1978 revisions provided by Senate Bill 364, supra note 1, at
3, now declares as a purpose the provision of "a system for the rehabilitation or
detention of juvenile delinquents" (emphasis added).
" Siegal, Senna, Libby, Legal Aspects of the Juvenile Justice Process: An
Overview of Current Practices and Law, 12 NEw ENG. L. REv. 223 (1976).
H W. VA. CODE § 49-5-1(d) (1977) extended procedural and evidentiary protec-
tions to children under juvenile court jurisdiction. Limitation on the availability
of extra-judicial statements (confessions) probably resulted in the processing of
fewer cases. The 1978 revisions of this section relaxed these restrictions to some
extent. For instance, the protection against admission of certain extra-judicial
statements was removed from youths sixteen or over.
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who violated a law (whether or not criminal in nature), any incorri-
gible or ungovernable child, and any child who was habitually
truant. The number of youths involved in the juvenile system was
often, therefore, a matter of administrative choice and institu-
tional capacity. Senate Bill 200 placed four types of activities
within the definition of delinquent child.51 The first two have been
described as "crime with time" and "crime with fine;"52 the third
as a restatement of the "incorrigibility" status offense with an
interesting twist. The language bears close scrutiny as it narrows
the offense to "habitually and continually" refusing "to respond to
the supervision legally required of such child's parents or cus-
todian."53 The threshold question necessarily becomes determining
what type of supervision is legally required of parents. No clear
answer is available, but two possible sources for an answer lie in
"Delinquent child" means a person under the age of eighteen years who:
(1) Violates a law or municipal ordinance;
(2) Commits an act which if committed by an adult would be a
crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment;
(3) Is incorrigible, ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and
beyond the control of his parent, guardian, or other custodian;
(4) Is habitually truant;
(5) Without just cause and without the consent of his parent,
guardian, or other custodian, repeatedly deserts his home or place
of abode;
(6) Engages in an occupation which is in violation of the law;
(7) Associated with immoral or vicious persons;
(8) Frequents a place, the existence of which is in violation of law;
(9) Deports himself so as to wilfully injure or endanger the morals
or health of himself or others.
Subsections (7) and (9) were held void under the due process clauses of both
the state and federal constitutions in the case of State v. Flinn, 208 S.E.2d 538 (W.
Va. 1974).
"0 Id.
" W. VA. CODE § 49-1-4 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This section provides:
"Delinquent child" means a child:
(1) Who commits an act which would be a crime under state law
or a municipal ordinance if committed by an adult punishable by
confinement in the county jail or imprisonment;
(2) Who commits an act designated a crime under a municipal
ordinance or state law not punishable by confinement in the
county jail or imprisonment;
(3) Who, without just cause, habitually and continually refuses to
respond to the supervision legally required of such child's parents
or custodians; or
(4) Who is habitually absent from school without good cause.
52 Id.
0 Id. (emphasis added).
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examination of common-law responsibilities of parents for certain
torts of their children and examination of the definition of
"neglected child." The former merely aids in determining the level
of supervision required to prevent a parent from being held negli-
gent. Tort concepts of parental responsibility for supervision as-
sume that a parent will exercise a level of supervision reasonably
necessary to prevent harmful conduct by his child. 4 A statutory
definition of "neglected child" which placed supervisory burdens
upon parents, guardians and custodians would clearly establish a
yardstick for determining what level or type of supervision is le-
gally required. Refusal, failure or inability to provide supervision
of any kind was not considered in the definition of "neglected
child" provided in Senate Bill 200,15 however, except as lack of
supervision may be a factor in the total abandonment of the
child." The lack of a clear definition of what constitutes legally
required supervision led to a subtle but important change in the
wording of the incorrigibility section of Senate Bill 364. That sec-
tion now provides that a delinquent child is one "who, without just
cause, habitually and continually refuses to respond to the lawful
supervision by such child's parents, guardian or custodian"
5, For a general discussion of parental liability for the acts of children, see 14
MIcHI.'s JuR. Parent and Child § 21 (Supp. 1977).
5S Senate Bill 200 provided in pertinent part as follows:
"Neglected child" means a child:
(1) Whose physical or mental condition is impaired or endangered
as a result of the present refusal, failure or inability of the child's
parent or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clo-
thing, shelter, medical care or education, notwithstanding efforts
of the state department to remedy the inadequacy, and the condi-
tion is not due primarily to the lack of financial means of the
parent or guardian ....
Senate Bill 364 removes from the neglect definition any reference to the state's
efforts to remedy the inadequacy and provides the following:
"Neglected child" means a child:
(1) Whose physical or mental condition is impaired or endangered
as a result of the present refusal, failure or inability of the child's
parent, guardian or custodian to supply the child with necessary
food, clothing, shelter, supervision, medical care or education and
the condition is not due primarily to the lack of financial means
of the parent, guardian or custodian...
(emphasis added to new language).
:' The definition of neglected child in Senate Bill 200 also included the follow-
ing category of children: "(2) Who is presently without necessary food, clothing,
shelter, medical care, education or supervision because of the disappearance or
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[emphasis added]." Consequently, it appears that, to be excused
from the supervision contemplated by Senate Bill 364, a juvenile
must show that such supervision was unlawful. This standard is
arguably as broad or broader than the language provided prior to
Senate Bill 200.11
A fifth category has been added by Senate Bill 364 to the list
of juvenile offenses so that any child "who willfully violates a con-
dition of a probation order or a contempt order of any court" is now
a delinquent child. 9 Important questions arise concerning the im-
plications of this additional category especially when considering
the proper disposition of a child found to be delinquent under this
provision."0 Particularly troublesome is the problem of placing
"category five" offenders in secure custody. Placement of juveniles
in secure facilities often turns on the distinction between "status"
and "criminal" offenders.6' Most of the children who might fall
within a "category five" offense are those already determined to
be delinquent under one of the other categories. Unless the child
commits an act which' would amount to criminal contempt, it
would appear that "category five" has little utility beyond that
obtainable by a simple modification of a prior delinquency order.62
"Category five" might be used, however, to buttress a heretofore
much ignored section found in the "General Provisions" article of
W. VA. CODE § 49-1-4(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
' See statutory language as quoted in note 49.
' W. VA. CODE § 49-1-4(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
See W. VA. CODE §§ 49-5-13, -16 as provided by Senate Bill 364.
, Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977). Item 4 of the syllabus
provides: "Under no circumstances can a child adjudged delinquent because of a
status offense, i.e., an act which if committed by an adult would not be a crime,
be incarcerated in a secure, prison-like facility with children adjudged delinquent
because of criminal activity." Item 6 of the syllabus provides that a status offender
may not be held in a secure, prison-like facility unless found to be "so ungovernable
or anti-social that no other reasonable alternative exists, or. . . could exist..."
The court's limitations on the secure custody of status offenders were incorpo-
rated into the language of Senate Bill 200, W. VA. CODE §§ 49-5-13, -16 (Cum.
Supp. 1977). These sections also cover pre-adjudicatory custody which was not
before the court in the Harris case.
'2 W. VA. CODE § 49-5-14 (S.B. 364, 1978) provides for modification of disposi-
tional orders to more restrictive alternatives upon clear and convincing proof of a
substantial violation of a court order. The modification process is much simpler
than the original petition process necessary to a determination of delinquency.
One application of "category five" which might be useful would involve proba-
tion violations and contempt of court by children found guilty of a crime following
transfer to criminal jurisdiction. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10 (S.B. 364, 1978).
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Chapter 49 establishing criminal penalties for failure to comply
with a court order issued under the authority of the chapter. 3
Unlike criminal law, the law of juvenile delinquency has al-
ways been a purely legislative creation." The incidence of juvenile
delinquency, of course, depends upon how the legislature defines
delinquency and the resources available to discover it. Public per-
ceptions often define delinquency in terms of what the community
perceives to be undesirable behavior. This has probably contrib-
uted to a tendency to treat runaway children in the same manner
as delinquent children. Runaway children, as such, have not been
defined as delinquent children under West Virginia law although
prior to Senate Bill 200 a child who repeatedly, without just cause,
and without consent, deserted his home fell within the definition
of delinquency. The first-time runaway was not per se a neglected
child65 and under the revisions is not necessarily a neglected child
either. Senate Bill 364 extends to the police, however, certain pow-
ers of custody over runaways under the juvenile procedures provi-
sions but only pending receipt of an appropriate court order, which
must be applied for immediately upon taking a child into cus-
tody.66 Except for the possibility of an order pursuant to the Inter-
state Compact On Juveniles, 7 no such order may actually be ob-
tainable unless based upon grounds other than running away. It
would be a simpler matter conceptually to treat runaways com-
pletely outside the juvenile-delinquency system.6
'" W. VA. CODE § 49-7-20 (1976 Replacement Vol.). This section is extremely
broad as it penalizes any person "who violates an order, rule, or regulation made
under authority of this chapter." Even after reading into the language the requisite
willfulness of the activity and the necessary lawfullness of the order, the coverage
is broad enough to allow for serious abuse. For example, in the area of juvenile
procedures, it would be a simple matter to dispose of a minor status offense by
placing a child under a probation order setting out rigid conditions. Failure to
comply with such conditions would subject the child to potential delinquency
charges under both "category one" and "category five" offenses.
'" W. VA. CODE § 49-1-4(5) (1976 Replacement Vol.). See note 49 for text.
' See statutory language at notes 55 and 56.
" W. VA. CODE §j 49-5-8(b), (c) and (d) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
87 W. VA. CODE §§ 49-8-1 et seq. (1976 Replacement Vol.). It appears that the
purposes and procedures established under the Interstate Compact On Juveniles
are in some respects contradictory to the extent and procedures provided by the
1977 and 1978 revisions of other portions chapter 49. The length of custody provi-
sions of the Compact, for instance, far exceed the custody powers conferred by
article 5, chapter 49. Compare W. VA. CODE § 49-8-2 with § 49-4-1 to -6 (1976
Replacement Vol.) (return of runaways).
1, Ketcham, Why Jurisdiction Over Status Offenders Should be Eliminated
from Juvenile Courts, 57 B.U.L. Rv. 645 (1977).
[Vol. 80
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Defining delinquency is more complicated than relying on the
truism that delinquency is whatever the legislature says it is. The
public demand to invoke the coercive powers of the juvenile court
to restrain undesirable behavior will undoubtedly continue to in-
fluence judicial constructions of these definitions,"9 just as that
demand has led to the legislative response in Senate Bill 364 au-
thorizing the police to take custody of runaways under the juvenile
provisions.
B. Entry into the Juvenile Process
The circuit courts have had and still do retain primary juris-
diction over juvenile proceedings." The role of other courts in the
juvenile process has been clarified by Senate Bill 200' and Senate
Bill 36472 so that certain traffic violations and offenses for which a
sentence of confinemeni is not sought may be handled by inferior
courts having concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts. Ac-
cording to both revisions, a child may be brought before the circuit
court only by three methods: juvenile petition based on allegations
of neglect or delinquency; certification from courts having criminal
jurisdiction or from other courts; or warrant or similar process."
Both certification and warrant procedures are designed ultimately
to result in the filing of a juvenile petition,74 which is the basis of
any further judicial procedure.
U Id. at 650.
7o W. VA. CODE §j 49-5-1 to -5-4 (1976 Replacement Vol.); id. §§ 49-5-1, -2
(Cum. Supp. 1977); id. §§ 49-5-1, -2 (S.B. 364 supra, note 1, 1978).
"' W. VA. CODE §§ 49-5-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
72 W. VA. CODE §§ 49-5-1(a), -5-1a, -5-1b (S.B. 364, supra, note 1, 1978).
'3 W. VA. CODE § 49-5-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE (S.B. 364, supra
1978). Besides clarifying prior language, Senate Bill 364, supra note 1, extends the
power of issuing warrants in juvenile matters to magistrates excluded under the
prior bill. A warrant, capias or attachment issued by judge, referee or magistrate
charging a child with an act of delinquency is not returnable to the circuit court
under the new bill. Although the language of section 49-5-2 in both bills purports
to set out the three exclusive means for bringing a child before the circuit court,
both also provide a fourth method for bringing children before the circuit court in
section 49-5-9(d) which requires that a child in custody be immediately taken
before a referee or a judge for a detention hearing. The logical resolution of the
apparent conflict between these sections would be to release the child in a detention
hearing, if no petition, certification, warrant or similar process were outstanding.
" W. VA. CODE § 49-5-7(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-7(d) (S.B.
364, supra 1978). Both acts also provide that, if a child is in custody, a petition must
be served within ninety-six hours of the time custody began. Senate Bill 364, supra
note 1, specifies that it is the child who is to be served when in custody.
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The revisions, however, have incorporated into the juvenile
sections specific procedures and devices for diverting youths from
the judicial process. Methods have been introduced for referring
children alleged to be delinquent to various counseling services,
among which is the threat of a noncustodial-counseling order."
The "category five" offense may find its greatest utility as a sanc-
tion for a child's failure to comply with a noncustodial-counseling
order. Senate Bill 364 expressly allows probation officers discretion
to enter into informal adjustment counseling or to file a juvenile
petition. 6 This alternative has arguably been available prior to
Senate Bill 364. The addition of this provision not only represents
deference to the judiciary, which supervises probation officers and
staff, but also indicates legislative emphasis on informal resolution
of problem behavior. Even upon the filing of a juvenile petition,
the court has the power to direct a preliminary inquiry to deter-
mine whether the matter can be resolved informally.77
Besides entering the juvenile process by petition or informal
counseling, a child may initially enter it by being taken into cus-
tody by a law-enforcement official without a warrant or court
order.71 Senate Bill 200 declared that "[a]bsent a court order, a
child [could] be taken into custody by a law-enforcement official
only if grounds exist[ed] for the arrest of an adult in identical
circumstances."" This limitation announced a dramatic departure
from past practice: it destroyed the effectiveness of juvenile-curfew
laws and ordinances. Under Senate Bill 200 status offenders and
runaways are no longer immediately detainable. Community ex-
" W. VA. CODE § 49-5-3 (Cum. Supp. 1977), as amended by W. VA. CODE §
49-5-3 (S.B. 364, supra 1978). Although the language provided by Senate Bill 364,
supra note 1, was intended to simplify and to clarify the noncustodial counseling
initiated by Senate Bill 200, supra note 1, several problems remain. First, any
notice must state that a noncustodial-counseling order will be sought from a court,
but subsequent language suggests that either a court or a referee may direct a child
to participate in counseling. This discrepancy is partially resolved by assuming
that, if the court is requested to issue a noncustodial order, the court may delegate
the matter entirely to a referee. Second, information "obtained as the result of such
counseling" is not admissible in subsequent proceedings under the article. It is not
evident that "such counseling" refers to counseling under a noncustodial order or
to any counseling contemplated under the section.
' W. VA. CODE § 49-5-3a (S.B. 364, supra, note 1, 1978).
" W. VA. CODE § 49-5-7(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-7(a) (S.B.
364, supra, note 1, 1978).
"' W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8(b) (S.B.
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pectations that law-enforcement personnel will be able to pick up
status offenders and runaways led to rediscovery of the emergency
provisions of chapter 49.0 Article two provides, inter alia, that the
State Department of Welfare may accept custody of a child from
a police officer in an emergency situation until a temporary cus-
tody order can be obtained.8 Although these provisions do not
speak directly to the authority of a police officer to obtain custody
of a child initially, they have been used to justify such custody
through varying interpretations of "emergency situation." Senate
Bill 364 alleviates the vagueness and the broadness of that phrase
by providing that in the absence of a warrant or a court order a
law-enforcement official may take a child into custody if
"emergency conditions exist which, in the judgment of the officer,
pose imminent danger to the health, safety and welfare of the
child." 2 Law-enforcement personnel are also given the authority
to take runaways into custody if there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the child has run away without just cause and that the
child's health, safety, and welfare are endangered.
Under the provisions of Senate Bill 200 a child taken into
custody must be immediately brought before a judge or a referee
for a detention hearing, which must be held by the end of the next
succeeding judicial day, excluding Saturday, or the child must be
released. Because it adds runaways to those children who may be
taken into custody without a warrant or an order, Senate Bill 364
has also created some procedural problems. Upon taking any child
into custody without a warrant or an order, a law-enforcement
official must immediately cause to issue a warrant, a petition or
an order authorizing the detention of the child." Except for neglect
petitions, no such warrant, petition or order is available to author-
ize detention of an in-state runaway. Senate Bill 364 further limits
custody of a runaway to no more than forty-eight hours without a
court order or no more than seven days in any event.8 A child in
custody must be afforded a detention hearing by the end of the
next succeeding judicial day following placement into custody.
50 Id. § 49-2-16 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
" Id.
92 Id. § 49-5-8(b)(2).
Id. § 49-5-8(b)(3).
Id. 99 49-5-8(c),(d) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Id. § 49-5-8(b)(iv) (1978).
" Id. § 49-5-8(b) (1978).
Id. § 49-5-8(d). This section no longer excludes Saturdays from the time
computation even though section 49-5-8(c) continues to exclude Saturdays for pur-
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The sole issue at these hearings is whether the child should be
detained pending further court proceedings.s Handling runaway
children becomes a complicated problem under Senate Bill 364.
The easy solution for law-enforcement officials under the bill is to
pick up runaways and return them either to their home or to the
police station where parents or guardians may be contacted. De-
taining runaways longer than is necessary for placing them in a
home or in alternative non-detention facilities may be questioned
on the ground of insufficient authority even prior to the expiration
of the maximum forty-eight hour period allowed without court
order, especially in cases where there may not be ahy appropriate
judicial authorization available. The complexity and apparent
contradictions in these custodial provisions will undoubtedly en-
courage the diversion of youths from the juvenile system. It is not
apparent, however, that this result was intended by the legislature.
My discussion is not an exhaustive survey of the intricacies
involved in entering the juvenile system, but it is representative
of the problems faced by the legislature as it attempts to define the
interface between governmental activity and private, community,
and social behavior.
C. Substantive and Procedural Rights and the Limits of Avail-
able Resources
In Harris v. Calendine the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that, when determining the appropriate disposition
of status offenders, the test is not what alternatives are actually
available but rather what alternatives "could reasonably be made
available in an enlightened and humane state solicitous of the
welfare of its children but also mindful of other demands upon the
state budget for humanitarian purposes."89 Courts must first esti-
mate the potential resources of the state and then strike a balance
among humanitarian services. This balance must be based on
poses of time limits prior to release by sheriffs and detention directors. This discrep-
ancy is probably the result of the "cutting and pasting" which took place in confer-
ence committee so that the language of sub-section (d) was taken from the House
version and the language of the sub-section (c) was taken from the Senate version.
0 Id. Senate Bill 200, supra note 1, required determinations of "sufficient
grounds for the arrest" [sic] and "probable cause for the offense."
U 233 S.E.2d 318, 331 (W. Va. 1977). At this point in its opinion, the court
discussed institutional alternatives and based its holding on the theory that a
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priorities according to what the courts think an enlightened and
humane state would favor. Those who fear judicial encroachment
of legislative functions will find no solace in the Harris decision.
That decision, however, was closely followed by the passage of
Senate Bill 200 by which the legislature reestablished its primary
role by setting standards and goals for juvenile justice.
The Harris court inferred from the development of the
juvenile-court system in the United States that its adoption in
West Virginia was for benevolent and humanitarian purposes."
Senate Bill 200 provides an express statement of purpose beyond
the mere establishment of a comprehensive child-welfare system
and incorporates the "enlightened" goals suggested by Harris."
Specifically, the purpose of the child-welfare system is:
[to] assure to each child such care and guidance, preferably in
his own home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental and
physical welfare of the child; . . . to provide for removing the
child from the custody of parents only when the child's welfare
or the safety and protection of the public cannot be adequately
safeguarded without removal; and,. . . to secure for him cus-
tody, care and discipline consistent with the child's best inter-
ests. 92
No distinction is made between the child who is neglected and the
child who is delinquent, at least with regard to custodial alterna-
tives. This expansive statement of purpose may result in its own
demise, especially if state government should discover it cannot
deliver the contemplated results. The substantive due process
analysis, of which the Supreme Court of Appeals is becoming
fond," poses the greatest threat to existing juvenile institutions
and programs which fail to provide "custody, care and discipline
as nearly as possible equivalent" to that which the child should
have received in his own home. Senate Bill 364, however, signals
a retreat from these standards: first, it avows as its purpose "to
reduce the rate of juvenile delinquency and to provide a system for
the rehabilitation or detention of juvenile delinquents;"" and, sec-
ond, where children are removed from parental custody, the care,
custody, and discipline a child is to receive is no longer that which
is nearly equivalent to what he should have received but is the
90 Id.
" W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
9 Id.
' Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E. 2d 109 (W. Va. 1974).
" W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
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"custody, care and discipline consistent with the child's best
interests."95 The "consistent-with-best-interests" test of Senate
Bill 364 blunts any substantive due process attack on institutional
programs, practices and services. The question remains whether
the direction taken by the Harris court is affected by an expression
of legislative intent which sets lesser standards than does Senate
Bill 200 for child-welfare services. The change must be justified
under the language quoted from Harris which suggests that the
legislature must also be mindful of budgetary limitations.
The legislature matched the Harris court ban on incarcerating
status offenders with criminal offenders in the express language of
Senate Bill 20098 and in addition provided the same protection to
children charged with status offenses but not yet found to be delin-
quent." Senate Bill 364 extends the protection of status offenders
to the new "category five" violators (children who violate proba-
tion or court orders) except that such violators who have also been
found delinquent for an offense which would be a crime if commit-
ted by an adult may not be detained with other status offenders.
Institutions established for the secure detention of juveniles have
been left in a posture of housing either criminal or status offenders
and, as a practical matter, have chosen to detain criminal offend-
ers alone. Following passage of Senate Bill 200, no facilities existed
in the state for the secure detention of status offenders. Non-secure
facilities, such as group homes and emergency shelters, began to
take and are currently taking children who formerly were held in
secure-detention institutions. No appropriations were passed ei-
ther in 1977 or 1978 aimed at developing or maintaining the neces-
sary alternatives to secure detention for criminal offenders.
When juveniles were detained under Senate Bill 200, three
Id. (emphasis added).
, Id. § 49-5-16(a).
" Id. This sub-section provides in pertinent part as follows:
A child charged with or found to be delinquent under subdivision (3) or
(4), section four article one of this chapter, shall not be housed in a
detention or other facility wherein persons are detained for criminal of-
fenses or for delinquency involving offenses which would be crimes if
committed by an adult.
'a W. VA. CODE § 49-5-16(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978). A close reading of this provi-
sion suggests that some "category five" offenders or alleged offenders may not be
incarcerated with "status" offenders or with "criminal" offenders.
" Act of June 22, 1977, ch. 2, 1977 W. Va. Acts 1st Extraordinary Sess.; Act of
March 13, 1978, Enr. S.B. 50, "The Budget Bill," Sen. Journal, Mar. 13, 1978, pp.
25-51; House Journal, Mar. 13, 1978, pp. 28-54.
[Vol. 80
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evidentiary hearings were required prior to disposition: first, a de-
tention hearing where probable cause for the arrest and for the
offense were in issue;' second, a preliminary hearing where proba-
ble cause to believe the child to be delinquent was in issue;",' and,
third, an adjudicatory hearing where the charges were to be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."' Jurisdictions which did not have
juvenile referees' 3 were faced with the problem of requiring circuit-
court judges to hear the same evidence three different times. Such
a system created problems of bias and partial review of evidence.
No provisions were made for the appointment or the remuneration
of new juvenile referees. One option considered by courts pressed
with the constraints of time or concerned about the impartial re-
view of evidence was the appointment of magistrates as referees
without additional salary. The position of referee or magistrate-
referee is important where juvenile judges are not available be-
cause detention hearings must take place within one judicial day
from the inception of custody. Two changes accomplished by the
passage of Senate Bill 364 may alleviate these problems. The scope
of detention hearings has been narrowed to the sole issue of
whether the child should be detained pending further proceed-
ings.' 4 Where a judge or referee is unavailable, a detention hearing
may now be held by a magistrate.' 5
'' W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8(d) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
, Id. § 49-5-9.
,o Id. § 49-5-11.
,o Id. §§ 49-5A-1 to -6 (1976 Replacement Vol. & Cum. Supp. 1977). First
enacted in 1972 these provisions create a juvenile-referee system whereby referees
may be appointed by the circuit courts to be paid out of the state treasury under
guidance from the highest court of this state. Though referees cannot conduct
hearings on the merits of any case, they are empowered to conduct detention hear-
ings and to order the detention of juveniles. The 1978 amendments include a change
in section 49-5A-5 governing detention in other counties. The original provision
(1976 Replacement Volume) only allowed detention in other counties with the
consent of the bhild or child's counsel. The consent requirement was subsequently
eliminated. (Cum. Supp. 1978) or (Enr. Comm. Sub. S.B. 364. 1978). Where chil-
dren could not be incarcerated in a jail facility and no other facility was available
in a county, a child could technically force authorities to release him by refusing
consent. This posed a serious problem for those counties, usually rural, with inade-
quate resources.
0 ' W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8(d) (Enr. Comm. Sub. S.B. 364) or W. VA. CODE § 49-
5-8(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
,O Id.; W. VA. CODE § 49-5A-3 (Enr. Com. Sub. S.B. 364) or W. VA. CODE §
49-5A-3 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Another change in section 49-5-8(d) aimed at economy
is a new provision under Senate Bill 364, supra note 1, allowing preliminary hear-
ings to be held in conjunction with detention hearings provided that all parties are
prepared and that the child has counsel.
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Although Senate Bill 364 includes several provisions which
may reduce expenses of juvenile proceedings and allow for practi-
cal use of existing facilities, the act also creates problems in its
allocation of resources. For instance, the Department of Welfare
bears the responsibility for juvenile parole without any extra fund-
ing, personnel, or other resources.' The bill also provides that all
juvenile records expunged "by operation of law" must be returned
to the juvenile court for safekeeping. 7 It seems unnecessary to go
to the expense of preserving the records from all agencies involved
with juvenile proceedings when "[e]xpungement shall have the
legal effect as if the offense never occurred." ' 8 The tension between
procedural and substantive requirements and the limits of avail-
able resources creates a risk of unequal treatment of youths
throughout the state. The lack of locally available resources, in-
cluding appropriate facilities, will contribute to the diversion of
youths from the juvenile system but may also contribute to inap-
propriate placements and to the use of inappropriate services.
D. Loose Ends
Several peculiar problems and anomolous situations besides
those already mentioned may need further legislative attention.
Picking and choosing between House and Senate versions in con-
ference committee has resulted in some contradictory and conflict-
ing language.' 9 For example, under Senate Bill 200 any person
filing a juvenile petition had to include the name and address of
the child's parents, guardians or custodians in the petition"' and
it then had to be served on them even in cases where they were also
petitioners."' Senate Bill 364 removed the requirement that par-
ents, guardians or custodians include in petitions their own names
and addresses when they were petitioning but failed to eliminate
'0 W. VA. CODE § 49-2-13 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
101 Id. § 49-5-17. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 693 (4th ed., 1951) defines "expunge"
to mean "to destroy or obliterate; it implies not a legal act, but a physical annihila-
tion."
' Id. at sub-section (b).
I Section 49-5-7(a) of Senate Bill 200 authorized the court or referee to set a
time and a place for a preliminary hearing and appointment of counsel, whereas
only the court is so authorized under the amendment to that section. This may have
been an oversight. See note 87 supra, for discussion of language discrepancy in
detention procedures.
11 W. VA. CODE § 49-5-7(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
"I Id. § 49-5-7(b).
[Vol. 80
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the requirement that they be named respondents and served with
notice when they were also petitioning."'
Children's and families' rights of privacy is another problem
area. The legislature has provided criminal penalties for the unau-
thorized release of juvenile or other records of children,"1 but has
not defined the term "record." In fact, no provision is made for
preventing the release of information concerning a child by anyone
with personal knowledge of the child's case." 4 The language of
these confidentiality provisions literally apply to all state and pri-
vate agencies and facilities, including educational and health insti-
tutions."' Perhaps the legislature did not intend to extend the
protection of children's records this far.'
In general, many of the changes made by Senate Bill 364 in
amending Senate Bill 200 have clarified or eliminated confusing or
contradictory material. Such major revisions must be expected to
leave problems in their wake to which future legislatures will need
to address technical modifications. The system will not be able to
achieve harmony, however, if each amendment also involves shifts
in philosophy and ultimate goals.
m. CONCLUSION: LEGISLATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
When society, especially through legislation, classifies its
12 Id. §§ 49-5-7(a),(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
1 W. VA. CODE §§ 49-5-17, -7-1 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
II Id. An additional problem under section 49-7-1 includes the proper defini-
tion of "parent" for purposes of the release of information; for example, may a
natural parent request and obtain release of information following relinquishment
or termination of parental rights? Another conceptual problem also arises where the
child becomes an adult; for example, is a record developed prior to emancipation
or majority still a record "concerning a child" after emancipation or majority?
What about the availability of adoption records to an adoptee who is now an adult?
The provisions of section 49-7-1 are either too vague or too broad to allow adequate
answers to these questions.
"5 W. VA. CODE § 49-7-1 (Cum. Supp. 1978). This section provides in pertinent
part that "[a]ll records of the state department, the court and its officials, law-
enforcement agencies and other agencies or facilities concerning a child as defined
in this chapter shall be kept confidential and shall not be released." (emphasis
added).
"' Id. The language of the section infers consideration by the legislature of
abuse and neglect situations and juvenile proceedings. Other types of record collect-
ing situations are not specifically discussed, such as school records or hospital
records. Furthermore, the language of this section is substantially the same as was
first introduced by Senate Bill 200 which placed primary emphasis on revising
juvenile procedures and neglect and abuse procedures.
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members according to age, race, sex, and other factors, it often
uses those labels to limit the legal and social options of the class
at the expense of capable or unique individuals. Legislative and
judicial processes provide a forum in which individual rights and
freedoms may be established and enforced. The one class most
uniformly and thoroughly denied access to legislative and judicial
processes is that of children. This denial of access results largely
from legal devices intended to protect children who, by reason of
immaturity, lack of experience and even physical size, may be
especially vulnerable. In the various hearings and discussions held
during the legislative session when the various bills which culmi-
nated in Senate Bill 364 were considered, the legislature heard
from teachers and lawyers, newspapermen and judges, law-
enforcement personnel and social workers, government adminis-
trators and private citizens-but no children either attended or
testified, not even an honorary Senate page. It is interesting to note
that after passage of Senate Bill 200 prosecutors and judges alike
raised initial complaints about the complexity and confusion of its
many new provisions. Law-enforcement personnel complained
that as soon as the bill went into effect, the "kids" knew all the
loopholes. Juxtaposition of these two observations suggests that
the real experts on children may be children. They often suffer the
evil consequences of our good intentions. The programs and proce-
dures initiated on their behalf have not been informed by feedback
from children. Even the best system of procedures and safeguards
and an abundance of resources will not result in success where
children's needs are poorly defined and the causes of delinquent
behavior are indistinct. Future legislative attempts at child-
welfare reform must be accompanied by circumspect analysis of
family and government relationships and must be accompanied by
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